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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES S. DEVINE, MRS. JAMES 
S. DEVINE and JANET GUSINDA, 




~ rl£LEN COOK and 
1
11 !l 
W. S. HATCH CO., INC. 
Defendants and Respon_dents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
W. S. HATCH CO., INC. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
:;: This appeal is taken by the plaintiffs and appellants, 
__., James S. Devine, Mrs. James S. Devine and Janet Gusinda, 
__. from a judgment and jury verdict entered against them 
/ 
and in favor of the defendants, Helen Cook and W. S. 
Hatch Co., Inc. in an action tried in the Second Judicial 
~~, District Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah. 
The appellants' brief contains a Statement of Facts and 
we will set forth herein those facts with which this de-
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fendant and respondent, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc. agrees, 
the facts with which this defendant takes issue, and other 
facts not referred to by plaintiffs in their brief. 
It is agreed that the action arose out of an automo-
bile accident in which the automobile owned and driven 
by the plaintiff, James S. Devine, collided with an automo-
bile driven by the defendant, Helen Cook; that the colli-
sion occurred at the intersection of 1500 South State 
Street, Bountiful, Utah, and U. S. Highway 91 (Tr. s, 
6) ; that plaintiffs were all proceeding north in the Devine 
automobile on U. S. Highway 91 and that the defendant, 
Helen Cook, had been proceeding east on 1500: South 
Street and had come to a stop at the stop sign where 1500 
South Street intersects with U. S. Highway 91, which is a 
through highway; that two tank outfits owned by this 
defendant, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc., a tank truck and four-
wheeled tank trailer, and a tractor pulling a semi-trailer 
carrying a tank, had also been proceeding north on U.S. 
Highway 91 and had slowed down in preparation of turn-
ing left to go west on 1500 South Street, and that the 
truck and four-wheeled trailer operated by Herschel Met-
calf had come to a stop in preparation of turning left 
(Tr. 7, 15, 16) ; that both truck drivers stated that they 
could not make the left turn until Mrs. Cook had cleared 
the intersection (Tr. 174, 175). 
In their brief appellants agree that the driver of the 
:first truck, Herschel Metcalf, stated that he did not re-
member motioning or signalling to Mrs. Cook to proceed 
across the intersection (Tr. 174); they contend, however, 
that 1Mrs. Cook and their witness, Elora Hutchings, both 
testified that Metcalf had motioned or signalled to Mrs. 
Cook to clear the intersection (Tr. 50, 60 Plaintiffs' Brief, 
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~p. 2). It should be noted, however, that the court granted 
~.this defendant's motion to strike the testimony of Elora 
Hutchings to the effect that Metcalf signalled Mrs. Cook 
t to pass in front of him as being a conclusion of the witness 
!~ (Tr. 50, 51), and that the court pointed out that the testi-
~ mony of Mrs. Cook that he motioned her to cross the high-
~ way was merely her assumption (Tr. 60, 61). Mrs. Cook 
:testified that Metcalf moved his arm twice in the manner 
·which she indicated and that there was just a second or 
:: two between the first time he moved his arm and the sec-
~ ond time (Tr. 61, 62). It should also be pointed out that 
: Mrs. Cook further testified that she knew the first tanker 
~ could not make the turn unless she was out of the way; 
~that the second tanker pulled up i~ back of the first 
: tanker and there were then two tankers that were stopped 
:on the highway and had to turn and go west (Tr. 61); 
. that the first tanker ,remained stopped for a couple of min-
: utes and the second tanker pulled up and came to a com-
: plete stop behind it before she started to move at all 
: (Tr. 64, 66) ; that she knew the driver of the tanker could 
·. not. make the turn west while she remained stopped there 
: and that she was aware of the fact that she was blocking 
; the highway to that extent (Tr. 64, 65) ; that she ob-
. served the first driver of the tanker had the mechanical 
signal out indicating that he intended to make a left turn 
and that she proceeded in front of the first tanker over 
into the east lane of the highway where she was hit (Tr. 
62). 
It should also be noted that Elora Hutchings, a wit-
ness called by the plaintiffs, testified that the first tanker 
had been completely stopped in the intersection a minute 
or two (Tr. 53, 56), and that Mrs. Cook was stopped for 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
the stop sign two or three minutes before she started for-
ward (Tr. 56); she further testified that after Herschel ; 
Metcalf gave the signal which she described, Mrs. Cook . 
hesitated about 30 seconds or so befpre she proceeded for- 1: 
ward (Tr. 54, 57). 
It is agreed that the plaintiff, James S. Devine, testi- . 
fied that the two tankers had previously passed his auto- . 
mobile and that as they approached the intersection of : 
1500 South State Street they began to slow down and he : 
assumed that they were either going to stop or most likely : 
make a left turn and he likewise began to slow down (T r. : 
15). He further testified that there was 100 or 150 feet . 
between the tankers as he was tra veiling along side them : 
down the road; that as he went to go past the front of the ; 
first truck he saw what he thought was a blur and stuck his :: 
foot on the brake and turned out to the side and came to 
almost a complete stop before the impact with the Cook~~ 
car occurred (Tr. 16). 
It is agreed that plaintiff, Mrs. James S. Devine, was . 
riding in the front seat sitting sideways with her back :. 
toward the right-hand front door, and that she was talking . 
to her sister who was riding in the back seat (Tr. 68); that j 
she testified that she noticed the two big oil tankers passing ~ 
them and that the tankers then began to slow down and . 
their car was slowing down; that she was looking at the · 
tankers and noticed a blur and then felt their car brakes 
being put on ( T r. 6 8) . On cross-examination she stated , 
that the brakes had been applied at the time she saw the ·. 
blur and that she did not say anything to her husband 
(Tr. 78, 79). 
The plaintiff, Janet Gusinda, testified that she was · 
sitting in the middle of the back seat (Tr. 86); that she 
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tr: 5aw the two tankers and that at first the tankers were 
~passing them and then they started to gradually catch 
t:up to the tankers and she thought she saw a wheel or some-
~thing on the other side of the road and thought the first 
tanker went on and that the Cook car came off the side 
~:road in front of the second truck (Tr. 85). She said 
::that it was her impression that a car was coming across 
rtthe highway but at the time the brakes were being applied 
:~and she did not say anything to Dr. Devine about it (Tr. 
~97, 98). 
h Herschel Metcalf, the driver of the first truck and 
,::.trailer, testified that he was travelling in the left lane for 
,\~northbound traffic; that he put the signal arm out to 
~:~indicate a left turn and saw the Cook car stop for the 
~~!:stop sign waiting for traffic to clear and that he did not 
~:have any idea which way Mrs. Cook intended to go; that 
::~it was impossible for him to make a left turn and he 
stopped and waited there approximately a minute to a 
}.~minute and a half for Mrs. Cook to go one way or the 
mxother so he could proceed (Tr. 146, 147, 148, Exhibits D, 
· E, 4, S and 6) . 
The driver of the second truck and semi-trailer, 
~'Philip Tumor, testified that he pulled up behind the truck 
:.and trailer driven by Metcalf, came to a complete stop 
~~and observed that Metcalf could not make the left turn 
r;because of the Cook automobile. He testified that he 
;~waited possibly a minute before the accident occurred 
i(Tr. 182). 
·;' After the parties had rested the case was submitted 
to the jury on written instructions and the jury returned 
~:a verdict of no cause of action against all the plaintiffs and 
:in favor of both defendants. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT PREJUDICIALLY AC. 
CENTUA TE THE DUTY OF THE PLAINTIFFS OR MINIMIZE 
THE DUTY OF THE DEFENDANTS AND NO EXCEPTION 
WAS MADE TO THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THESE GROUNDS. 
POINT II 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO IN. 
STRUCT THE JURY ON THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS, MISS GUSINDA AND 
MRS. DEVINE AND THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS 
REGARD WERE NOT ERRONEOUS OR PREJUDICIAL. 
POINT III 
ANY ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY COULD NOT 
PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS AS TO THE DEFENDANT, W. S. 
HATCH CO., INC., AS THE MOTION OF THE DEFENDANT, 
W. S. HATCH CO., INC., FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT PREJUDI-
CIALLY ACCENTUATE THE DUTY OF THE 
PLAINTIFFS OR MINIMIZE THE DUTY OF THE 
DEFENDANTS AND NO EXCEPTION WAS MADE 
TO THE INSTRUCTIO·NS ON THESE GROUNDS. 
Under Point I in their brief plaintiffs contend that 
the trial court's instructions prejudicially accentuated the 
duties of the plaintiffs and minimized the duty of the de-
fendants. At the time of trial plaintiffs did not except to 
the court's instructions on these grounds and they are 
limited on this appeal to the exceptions taken at the time 
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of trial. The entire exceptions taken by plaintiffs to 
the court's instructions are as follows: 
ucomes now the plaintiffs and except to the 
Instructions given by the Court and more particu-
larly to Instruction No. 4 and the third paragraph 
thereof which injects into the lawsuit the issue of 
contributory negligence on the part of Miss Gusinda 
and Mrs. Devine, the passengers in the automobile, 
since said issues were not clear 1 y raised by the 
pleadings and were not supported by any factual 
theory presented during the trial of the lawsuit. 
cc:The plaintiffs except to the giving of In-
struction No. 6 which likewise pertains to the duty 
of guests in an automobile on the very same grounds 
and reasons as stated in the exception immediately 
pre.ceding. 
uThe plaintiffs further except to Instruction 
No. 9 on the grounds and for the reasons that the 
last two sentences thereof single out one of the de-
fendants, Helen Cook, and prescribes as to her a 
limiting factor with reference to her duty which 
definition, if given at all, should be given to all of 
the parties generally who might have been charged 
with negligence or contributory negligence, as was 
requested by counsel for the plaintiffs prior to giv-
ing of said instruction." ( T r. 2 0 6) 
We can find nothing in the exceptions which would 
call the trial court's attention to plaintiffs claim that the 
instructions accentuated the duty of the plaintiffs or 
minimized the duty of the defendants. 
In the recent case of Employers' Mutual Liability 
Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Allen Oil Co., ________ U ta.h ________ , 
285 P. 2d 445, this court refused to consider an instruction 
on its merits where the objection raised at the trial failed 
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to point out with any degree of particularity wherein the 
proposed instruction was not supported by the law. In 
its opinion this court said and held: 
uThe appellants' objection in the trial court to 
instruction No. 19 was couched in general terms, 
viz. <on the grounds and for the reasons that such 
instruction is not supported by, and is contrary 
to, the law and the evidence. That it is mislead-
ing, and can only serve to confuse the jury.' The 
objection failed to comply with the requirements 
of Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that cln 
objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party 
must state distinctly the matter to which he objects 
and the grounds of his objection.' One of the pur-
poses in requiring .counsel to make objections to 
instructions in trial court is to bring to the at-
tention of the court all claimed errors in the in-
structions and to give him an opportunity to cor-
rect them if he deems it proper. The objection 
should be specific enough to give th~ trial court 
notice of the very error in the instruction which 
is complained of on appeal. But an objection that 
an instruction is <not supported by, and is con-
trary to, the law' lacks specificness and does not 
direct the court's attention to anything in par-
ticular. A proper objection to instruction No. 
19 which would have called the court's attention 
to the error raised on this appeal would have been 
<That it does not correctly state the limits or ex-
tent of the respondents' legal liability.' No objec-
tion having been made which pointed out with any 
degree of particularity wherein the instruction was 
not supported by law, we will not here consider 
the instruction on its merits." 
If, in the face of the limited exceptions taken by 
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plaintiffs they are now entitled to have the entire instruc-
tions reviewed, it should be kept in mind that the trial 
involved three plaintiffs and two defendants, each occupy-
ing a particular legal status and having different rights 
and duties. That the trial judge was fully aware of his 
responsibilities in defining the numerous issues in the case 
was apparent throughout the court's instructions and was 
further illustrated by the court's comment to the jury 
following his instructions and the arguments of counsel: 
((Gentlemen of the jury, I think maybe I will 
have something to say to you about these verdicts 
in addition to what has been said to you. As has 
been suggested there are virtually three· Ia wsui ts 
being tried in one. Now I have had the Clerk fix 
these verdicts in sets and they are in three sets here, 
comprising four verdicts in each case, and it will 
be necessary for you to return in each one of these 
cases a verdict. I am not suggesting which ones 
because you are the judges of that. But it will be 
necessary for you to have three verdict returns in 
these matters and I believe they are self-explana-
tory, not only by their wording but by what coun-
sel has indicated to you, so you will not have any 
trouble in reference to that." 
The four possible verdicts submitted in each of the 
three cases were as follows: ( 1) That the issues be found 
in favor of plaintiff and against both defendants and that 
damages be assessed, (2) that the issues be found in favor 
of the plaintiff and against the defendant, Helen Cook, 
and that damages be assessed, but that the issues be found 
against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendent, W. S. 
Hatch Co., Inc., no cause of action, ( 3) that the issues be 
found in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant, W. S. 
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Hatch Co., Inc., and that damages be assessed, but that 
the issues be found against the plaintiff and in favor of the 
defendant, Helen Cook, no cause of action, ( 4) that the 
issues be found against the plaintiff and in favor of both 
the defendants, no cause of action. This. made twelve 
verdicts in all that were submitted to the jury. The fact 
that the case took on this somewhat complicated aspect 
resulted from the fact that plaintiffs chose to bring the 
three lawsuits in one action and to attempt to fix liability 
on two defendants. It may be that this was a situation 
which would have been simplified by submitting special 
interrogatories to the jury, but plaintiffs did not suggest 
such a procedure but instead requested general instructions 
and acquiesced in the cases being submitted on general in-
structions. 
We submit that an examination of the entire instruc-
tions shows that the court very orderly and properly in-
structed the jury as follows: As to the issues of the case 
(Instruction No. 1), the burden of proof as it applied to 
both plaintiffs and defendants (Instruction No. 2), de-
fined unegligence," ucontributory negligence," and ttproxi-
mate cause" (Instruction No. 3) , explained the effect of 
contributory negligence on the part of Dr. Devine and 
on the part of the guest passengers, and the effect of such 
negligence if found to be the sole proximate cause and the 
fact that any negligence on the part of Dr. Devine could 
not be imputed to any of the passengers (Instruction No. 
4), outlined in general terms the duty of drivers on the 
highway and the right of way rule at intersections (In-
struction No. 5) , outlined specifically the duty of the 
guest passengers Mrs. Devine and Janet Gusinda (Instruc-
tion No. 6), outlined specifically the duty on the part of 
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the driver of theW. S. Hatch Co., Inc. truck (Instruction 
No. 7), outlined specifically the duty of Dr. Divine (In-
struction No. 8), outlined specifically the duty of the 
defendant, Helen Cook (Instruction No. 9), outlined the 
law on unavoidable accidents (Instruction No. 10) , advised 
the jury that if they found liability they should assess 
damages (Instruction No. 11 ) , explained the manner in 
which the damages should be assessed (Instruction No. 
12), and finally gave the usual stock instructions contain-
ing definitions and rules regarding the conduct of the 
jury (Instruction No. 13). The Plaintiffs' case was fairly 
presented to the jury and the court in no way emphasized 
the duty of the plaintiffs or minimized the duty of the 
defendants. 
To illustrate the emphasis given in the instructions 
the plaintiffs complain that Instruction No. 7 is prejudicial 
for the reason that it begins in the negative regarding the 
duty of the truck driver, Herschel Metcalf, while other 
instructions impose an affirmative duty on the plaintiffs. 
The fact is that this instruction was requested by the de-
fendant, Helen Cook, as Requested Instruction No. 12 
in an effort to cast liability on this defendant and it was 
objected to by this defendant at the time of trial as im-
posing a greater duty upon Herschel Metcalf than the 
law requires. In requesting the instruction, counsel for 
the co-defendant, Helen Cook, recognized the danger of 
imposing too great a duty upon the truck driver, Herschel 
Metcalf, and sought to shield the error of the instruction 
by asserting ((that a driver of a vehicle upon a highway 
has no duty to ascertain or advise other drivers whether 
they may safely enter upon or pass over said highway." 
If the instruction was repugnant to plaintiffs, it was par-
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ticularly so to this defendant as an over-statement of the 
duty imposed upon Herschel Metcalf. 
POINT II 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE ISSUE OF CON-
TRIBUTOR Y NEGLIGENCE O·F THE PLAINTIFFS, 
MISS GUSINDA AND MRS. DEVINE, AND THE 
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS REGARD 
WERE NO·T ERRONEOUS OR PREJUDICIAL. 
In their brief plaintiffs state that defendants did not 
plead contributory negligence on the part of the guest 
passengers until after the case had been tried and the 
court had indicated its intention to instruct the jury on 
contributory negligence. It is a fact that this defendant, 
W. S. Hatch Co., Inc., did not plead contributory negli-
gence on the part of the guest passengers until after the 
evidence was in and the court had indica ted its intention 
to instruct the jury regarding contributory negligence on 
the part of the guest passengers, at which time this de-
fendant moved to amend its complaint to conform to the 
evidence and alleged contributory negligence on the part 
of the guest passengers and the motion was granted (Tr. 
188, 189). 
The defendant, Helen Cook, however, pleaded con-
tributory negligence on the part of the guest passengers 
and tried the case on that theory and at the conclusion 
of the evidence it was apparent to the trial court and to 
defendants' counsel that there was sufficient evidence to 
take the case to the jury on the question of contributory 
negligence on the part of the guest passengers. 
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In their brief the plaintiffs overlook certain facts 
which create a decided conflict with plaintiffs' theory as 
to how the accident occurred. The witness, Elora Hutch-
ings, called and vouched for by the plaintiffs, testified 
that Mrs. Cook was stopped at the stop sign two or three 
minutes before she started forward (Tr. 57). Herschel 
Metcalf testified that he was stopped for a minute to a 
minute and a half (Tr. 148), and Mrs. Cook stated this 
time to be a couple of minutes (Tr. 64). Philip Tumor, 
the driver of the second truck, stated that he was stopped 
possibly a minute before the Devine car passed him (Tr. 
182). The plaintiff, Dr. Devine, testified that he was 
travelling about thirty to thirty-five miles per hour (Tr. 
40), that he had observed that the trucks had slowed down 
most likely to make a left turn (Tr. 50), that as he slowed 
down and went to go past the first truck he saw what he 
thought was a blur and stuck his foot on the brake and 
turned to the side, and that he came to almost a complete 
stop when the impact occurred (Tr. 16). The police 
officer called by the plaintiff testified that the Devine car 
laid down 49 feet of skid marks before the point of im-
pact and that the Cook car left no skid marks before the 
1m pact. 
Both of the guest passengers, Mrs. Devine and Janet 
Gusinda, testified that they saw the two tankers and Mrs. 
Devine testified that she noticed a blur and then felt the 
car brakes being put on, but she did not say anything to 
her husband (Tr. 68, 78, 79), while Janet Gusinda thought 
she saw a wheel or something and thought the first tanker 
went on and that the Cook car came off the side road in 
'front of the second truck (Tr. 85). It was her impression 
that a car was coming across the highway but at the time 
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the brakes were being applied and she did not say anything 
to Dr. Devine about it (Tr. 97, 98). 
It thus appears that the jury might well have found 
that the accident did not happen as claimed by plaintiffs 
but that a situation existed for a period of time ranging 
from one to two or three minutes during which time the 
plaintiffs, as they approached the intersection, might well 
have observed the condition and the guest passengers 
would have had ample time to apprise their driver of the 
situation after it appeared that he was not aware of the 
danger and did not intend to yield the right of way to 
Mrs. Cook. The fact that Mrs. Cook had the right of 
way cannot be disputed under the evidence, and accord-
ing to Dr. Devine's own testimony he was nearly stopped 
at the time of impact. The jury would have certainly 
been justified in finding that the slightest warning on the 
part of the guest passengers would have apprised Dr. 
Devine of the danger and enabled him to avoid the col-
lision. 
This court has on numerous occasions discussed the 
degree of care which a guest in an automobile or other 
vehicle must exercise for his own safety. In Atwood v. 
Utah Light & Ry. Co., 44 Utah 366, 140 P. 137, this court 
said: 
u ••• It no doubt is the law, as contended by 
appellant's counsel, that every occupant of a vehi-
cle in which he is riding, must always exercise ordi-
nary care for his own safety, and if, by the exercise 
of such care, he could avoid injury to himself, but 
fails to do so, he cannot recover, regardless of the 
fact that he had no control or direction of the ve-
hicle in which he was riding at the time of the ac-
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cident and injury. ~~ ::- * Of course every one who 
may be riding in a vehicle, whether as passenger, 
invitee, or otherwise, must always exercise ordinary 
care aJ?.d prudence to avoid injury to himself, and 
to that end, in case of imminent danger, must leave 
the vehicle in case such a course is practical and 
necessary to avoid injurye Again, he may not sit 
silently by and permit the driver of the vehicle to 
encounter or enter into open danger without pro-
test or remonstrance and take the chances, and, if 
injured, seek to recover damages from the driver of 
the vehicle or from the one whose negligence con-
curred with that of the driver's, or from both." 
The rule as to when contributory negligence shall be 
submitted to the jury and when it should be ruled on by 
the court as a matter of law is set forth in Shortino v. Salt 
Lake & U. R. Co., 50 Utah 476, 174 P. 860, as follows:. 
((That the question of contributory negligence 
on the part of the plaintiff, like that of the negli-
gence of the defendant, is for the jury, where the 
evidence and the inferences to be deduced there-
from are such that reasonable men may arrive at 
different conclusions, has so often been decided by 
this court that the proposition has, in effect, be-
come elementary. 
uln other words, if there is any substantial 
doubt whether a plaintiff was or was not guilty 
of contributory negligence, or whether, if negli-
gent, such negligence was the proximate cause of 
the injury, the court cannot determine the right 
to recover as a matter of law, but must submit the 
question of contributory negligence or of proxi-
mate cause, or both, to the jury as questions of 
fact. 
((Where, however, the facts are conceded, or 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
there is no conflict in the evidence, and upon a con-
sideration of all of the evidence, and the legitimate 
inferences that may be deduced therefrom, but one 
conclusion is permissible, then both questions are 
questions of law, and must be determined as such 
by the court." 
In Montague v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co., 52 Utah 386, 
174 P. 871, the court considered the duty of a guest rid-
ing in the same automobile involved in the accident in the 
Shortino case. In holding that the question of contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the guest was properly sub-
mitted to the jury, the court said: 
((The rule applicable here, which is adopted by 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of 
Cotton v. Willmar & S. F. Ry. Co., 99 Minn. 366, 
109 N. W. 835, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 643, 116 Am. 
St. Rep. 422, 9 Ann. Cas. 9 3 5, which case is cited 
and followed in the Atwood Case, supra, is stated 
thus: 
((The rule which has met with general ap-
proval in the more recent cases makes the passenger 
responsible only for his personal negligence, and 
leaves it to the jury to determine whether, under 
the circumstances he was justified in trusting his 
safety to the care of the driver and not looking or 
listening for himself. The negligence of the driver 
is thus not imputed to the guest or passenger, buf 
the circumstances may be such as to make it the 
duty of the passenger to look and listen and at-
tempt to control the driver for his own protection. 
The passenger is thus held responsible for his own 
negligence, but not for the negligence of the driver. 
He must exercise due care and caution, and, if his 
negligence contributes approximately to the acci-
dent, he cannot recover damages.'" 
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In Cowan v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co., 56 Utah 94, 189 
P. 599, suit was brought by another passenger in the 
Shortino car. The court gives an exhaustive review of 
cases from all states and concludes by approving the rules 
laid down in the Atwood case and Montague case. In its 
opinion the court said: 
u ::· :l~ ::· we can conceive of no reason why the 
question of whether a passenger or an invitee rid-
ing in a vehicle was guilty o~ contributory negli-
gence, in view of all the circumstances which would 
bar a recovery, should not be left to the jury, un-
less that question is free from substantial doubt." 
In Lawrence v. Denver and Rio Grande, 52 Utah 414, 
174 P. 817, it was held that a guest, failing to see the train 
where a view was apparently unobstructed and a warn-
ing signal was given, was guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law. In its decision this court said: 
((Assuming for the sake of argument, but not 
conceding, that plaintiff was merely the guest of 
Bird, and was in no sense responsible for the man-
ner in which Bird operated and managed the auto-
mobile while making the trip in question, it never-
theless was incumbent upon him to exercise 
ordinary care and prudence/ by making diligent 
use of his senses of sight and hearing, by looking 
and listening for trains as the automobile ap-
proached the crossing, and to heed the warnings 
and signals of the approach of the train, and to 
suggest to Bird that they stop until the danger was 
over, and to protest if that was not done * ::· ~· " 
(Citing cases) 
In objecting now to the trail court instructing on 
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contributory negligence on the part of the guest passen-
gers, and particularly as to the form of the instructions, 
the plaintiffs are again confronted with their exceptions 
to the court's instructions taken at the time of trial. The 
most that can be made out of plaintiffs' exceptions is that 
they ( I ) excepted to the third paragraph of Instruction 
No. 4 which injects into the lawsuit the issue of con-
tributory negligence on the part of Miss Gusinda and Mrs. 
Devine since the issues were not clearly raised by the 
pleadings and were not supported by any factual theory 
presented during the trial; ( 2) excepted to Instruction 
No. 6 on the very same grounds and reasons; and (3) ex-
cepted to Instruction No. 9 on the grounds that the last 
two sentences single out one of the defendants and limit 
her duty. 
On this appeal for the first time the plaintiffs com-
plain as to the form of Instruction No. 4 regarding the 
duty of Dr. Devine and to the form of Instruction No. 6 
regarding the duty of the guest passengers. We agree with 
counsel for defendant, Helen Cook, who requested the 
instructions, that the words complained of by plaintiffs 
uin any degree" and uto any extent, however slight" do 
not render the instructions so faulty as to be reversible 
error under the recent case of Johnson v. Lewis, et al, 
________ Utah ________ , 240 P. 2d 498. We strongly urge, how-
ever, that plaintiffs cannot be heard to complain as to 
the form of the instruction at this time. The only grounds 
for plaintiffs excepting to Instruction No. 4 and Instruc-
tion No. 6 were that the issue of contributory negligence 
on the part of Miss Gusinda and Mrs. Devine, the passen-
ge~s in the automobile, uwere not clearly raised by the 
pleadings and were not supported by any factual theory 
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presented during the trial of the lawsuit." (Tr. 206) As 
has already been pointed out the defendant, Cook, pleaded 
contributory negligence as an affirmative defense and 
tried the case on that theory and at the conclusion of the 
evidence the record shows that the court permitted the de-
fendant, W. S. Hatch, Co., Inc. to amend its answer to 
conform to the proof. It has also been demonstrated 
that there was ample evidence to support the defendants' 
theory of contributory negligence on the part of the guest 
passengers. If plaintiffs had been concerned about the 
form of the instructions on contributory negligence the 
objections should have been taken at the time of trial. 
We again call attention to the rule laid down by this 
court in Employer's Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin 
v. Allen Oil Co. (supra) that uNo objection having been 
made which pointed out with any degree of particularity 
wherein the instruction was not supported by law, we 
will not here consider the instruction on its merits." 
In Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah, 312, 67 P 2d 654, 
the court held that exceptions to instructions as a whole 
cannot be s1:1stained if part of the instruction is good. In 
its opinion the court said: 
((The exceptions to the instructions were as 
a whole. The exception did not even specify any 
particular instruction. The six instructions were 
grouped together. The (rule (is) too well estab-
lished to be the subject of controversy that such 
an exception cannot be sustained if any part of 
the instruction is good.' H'ansen v. Oregon S. L. 
R. Co., 55 Utah, 577, 188 P. 852, 854; McLaughlin 
v. Chief Consol. Min. Co., 62 Utah, 53 2, 220 P. 
726. In addition, the rule is that all parts of the 
charge to the jury must· be construed together. 
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When taken as a whole, if the charge is substan-
tially correct and could not have misled the jury, 
the verdict and judgment will not be disturbed. 
This rule bears such unquestioned indorsement and 
the cases supporting it are so numerous as to make 
the citation of authorities unnecessary." 
Again in Mehr v. Child, 90 Utah 348, 61 P 2d 624, 
the court said and held: 
uAppellants having confined their objections 
to the whole instruction which is divisible into 
integral parts, they are not entitled to prevail on 
their assignment with respect to that instruction. 
When an instruction is divisible into integral parts 
and any one or more of the integral parts is not 
open to objection, then, and in such case, an objec-
tion to the whole must fail. Among the numerous 
cases in this jurisdiction which so hold are the fol-
lowing: Farnsworth v. Union Pac. Coal Co., 32 
Utah, 112, 89 P. 74; Grow v. Utah Light & Ry. 
Co., 37 Utah, 41, 106 P. 514; Rampton v. Cole, 
52 Utah, 36, 172 P. 477; Hansen v. Oregon Short 
LineR. Co., 55 Utah, 577, 188 P. 852; McLaughlin 
v. Chief Consol. M. Co. 62 Utah, 532 220 P. 726." 
The plaintiffs' exception to Instruction No. 9 is not 
well taken. In that instruction the court outlined the 
duty of the defendant, Helen Cook, as he had outlined 
the duty of the defendant, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc. in In-
struction No. 7, the duty of the plaintiff, Dr. Devine, in 
Instruction No. 8 and the duty of Mrs. Devine and Janet 
Gusinda in Instruction No. 6. In Earle v. Salt Lake & 
Utah R. Corporation, ________ Utah ________ , 165 P. 2d, 877, the 
court held that the defendant could not complain of an 
instruction dealing with the duty imposed by law on the 
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railroad at intersections as unduly emphasizing the rail-
road's duty because the plaintiff's duty was not also set 
forth in such instruction where other instructions defined 
the plaintiff's duties. In its opinion the court said: 
u ::· ::· * In Instruction No. 11, the court de-
fined the duty imposed by law on defendant at 
intersections. Complaint is made that this unduly 
emphasizes defendant's duty because plaintiff's 
duty is not also set forth in that instruction. In 
Instructions Nos. 17, 18 and 19 the court defined 
the duty imposed on plaintiffs. It might have 
been more concise to get the instructions dealing 
with the duty of the respective parties closer to-
gether in the charge." 
POINT III 
ANY ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
COULD NOT PREJUDICE THE PLAINTIFFS AS TO 
THE DEFENDANT, W. S. HATCH CO., INC., AS 
THE MOTION OF THE DEFENDANT, W. S. 
HATCH CO., INC. FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
The only error claimed by the plaintiffs on this ap-
peal is directed to the trial court's instructions. We sub-
mit that if the trial court erred in its instructions to the 
jury, such error was not prejudicial to plaintiffs so far as 
the defendant, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc. was concerned, as 
the court should have granted such defendant's motion 
for directed verdict at the close of the case. After all 
parties had rested the defendant, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc. 
moved the court as follows: 
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ulf the court please, comes now the defendant, 
W. S. Hatch Company, and moves for an instruc-
tion directing the jury to return a verdict in favor 
of the defendant, W. S. Hatch Company, and 
against the plaintiffs, and each of them, no cause 
of action, on the ground and for the reason that 
the plaintiffs first have failed to show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence or by any evidence that 
the defendant, W. S. Hatch Company, was guilty 
of any actionable negligence which caused or con-
tributed to the cause of the accident and the result-
. . Ing In JUries. 
uSecond, that it affirmatively appears that 
James S. Devine, the driver of the car in which 
plaintiffs were riding, was guilty of negligence and 
that such negligence was the sole, proximate cause 
of the accident and the resulting injuries sustained 
by plaintiffs. 
uThird, that it affirmatively appears from the 
evidence that plaintiffs were each guilty of negli-
gence which contributed to the cause of the acci-
dent in failing to keep a proper look out and in 
failing to exercise ordinary care for their own 
safety and that such acts of negligence constituted 
contributory negligenc~ which would bar their 
recovery." (Tr. 189-190) 
The motion was taken under advisement and in view 
of the jury's verdict, was not ruled upon. This defendant 
earnestly contends that its motion for directed verdict 
should have been granted, particularly on the ground that 
the plaintiffs failed to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence or by any of the evidence that the defendant, 
W. S. Hatch Co., Inc., was guilty of any actionable negli-
gence which caused or contributed to the cause of the 
accident and the injuries. The only act or omission on 
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the part of W. S. Hatch Co., Inc. complained of by plain-
tiffs was that Herschel Metcalf, the driver of the first 
truck, signalled Mrs. Cook in the manner described by 
Mrs. Cook and Mrs. Hutchings. The plaintiffs contend 
that this signal was a direction to Mrs. Cook to proceed 
across the highway and that the way was clear for her 
to do so. There is no rule of law that would permit such 
a construction being placed on the evidence. Mr. Metcalf 
testified that he had no idea which direction Mrs. Cook 
intended to proceed. The evidence further showed that 
he was not in a position to advise Mrs. Cook of the traffic 
conditions nor did he attempt to do so. The very most 
that could be said of a signal such as the one described 
by Mrs. Cook and Mrs. Hutchings was that Metcalf was 
advising her that he was yielding the right of way to her 
and that so far as he was concerned she might proceed 
and he would not hit her. That such a signal would be 
limited to an assurance that Metcalf would yield the right 
of way to Mrs. Cook was recognized in the case of Harris 
v. Kansas City Public Service Commission (Supreme 
Court of Kansas, 1931) 297 Pac. 718. In that case two 
of defendant's street cars ware standing at the crossing 
which plain tiff, a pedestrian, intended to use, the rear of 
the front car and the front end of the following car both 
encroaching on the pedestrian crosswalk. The plaintiff, 
upon receiving a signal from the motorman of the rear 
car, went between the two cars and was struck by an-
other of defendant's cars proceeding in the opposite direc-
tion. The Supreme Court held as erroneous an instruction 
given by the trial court judge which charged the jury 
that plaintiff would not be guilty of contributory neg-
ligence if defendant's motorman signalled her to proceed 
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over the crossing and she relied upon such signal under 
the belief that there was no danger from an approaching 
car, unless such a danger was obvious to a prudent person. 
The court pointed out that the motorman's signal could 
mean no more than an assurance that he would not start 
his car and catch her between it and the car in front of it. 
In its opinion the court said: 
uThis instruction was based on the assumption 
that the motorman who signaled plaintiff had some 
duty to look out for pedestrians like plaintiff at 
that street intersection. His duty was to operate 
his own street car in a proper way so as not to in-
jure pedestrians or other traffic having the same 
right to use the street as the defendant corporation. 
He had no duty to protect her against injury from 
other street cars on parallel tracks. The defendant 
company could not confer such authority and re-
sponsibility upon its motormen. ::· * * There was 
no allegation that the motorman had authority to 
direct street car traffic or authority to signal this 
plaintiff that she could cross the street in safety. 
It would have been a usurption of the police powers 
of the city government itself for defendant to have 
authorized its motorman to undertake that duty." 
In further support of their motion for a directed 
verdict the defendant, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc., contends 
that the signal of Herschel Metcalf described by Mrs. 
Cook and Mrs. Hutchings could in no way have been 
the proximate cause of the collision between the Cook 
automobile and the car driven by the plaintiff, Dr. Devine. 
In Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., ________ Utah ________ , 132 
P. 2d 68, the trial court granted defendants' motion for 
non-suit and this court affirmed the ruling on the ground 
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that plaintiff failed to show causal connection between 
the negligent conduct complained of, namely the failure 
to give an arm signal, and the injury to plaintiff. In its 
opinion the court said: 
uThe only alleged negligence was the failure to 
signal and there was sufficient evidence to go to 
the jury on the question of whether the defendant 
signalled and whether the failure to signal was neg-
ligent conduct. But even so, the plaintiff still did 
not make out a prima facie case for recovery in 
negligence for there is no proof or evidence to show 
that the failure to give the arm signal was the prox-
imate cause of the injury. It is a fundamental 
principle of the law of negligence that the person 
complaining has the burden of showing causal 
connection between the negligent conduct com-
plaied of and the injury to the plaintiff. Bergman 
v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 53 Utah 213, 178 P 68; 
Newton v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 43 Utah 219, 
13 4 P. 5 67. In· the instant case, there was no evi-
dence to indicate that the tow truck driver failed 
to look before pulling away from the curb. The 
only negligent act complained of is the failure to 
signal. The plaintiff must supply the links in the 
chain of proximate cause which show that his fail-
ure to signal caused the collision. * ~· ~~ While 
deductions may be based on probabilities, the evi-
dence must do more than merely raise a conjecture 
or show a probability. Where there are probabili-
ties the other way equally or more potent the de-
ductions are mere guesses and the jury should not 
be permitted to speculate. The rule is well estab-
lished in this jurisdiction that where (the pro xi-
mate cause of the injury is left to conjecture, the 
plaintiff must fail as a matter of law.' Tremelling 
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v. Southern Pac. Co., 51 Utah 189, 170 P. 80, 84; 
Tremelling v. Southern Pac. Co., 70 Utah 72, 257 
P. 1066. Many cases are cited in support of this 
proposition and the court quoted with approval 
from 29 Cyc. 625 where it is stated: tThe evidence 
must, however, do more than merely raise a conjec-
ture or show a probability as to the cause of injury, 
and no recovery can be had if the evidence leaves 
it to conjecture which of two probable causes re-
sulted in the injury, where defendant was liable 
for only one of them.' 
uThe trial court correctly held that the plain-
tiff failed to make out a prima facie case for recov-
ery in negligence." 
Certainly it cannot be successfully claimed that the 
arm signal given under the circumstances described in 
the evidence of this case was an effective cause of the 
collision. The act of Mrs. Cook in hestitating thirty sec-
onds and then proce·eding into the east lane of Highway 
91 and the conduct of Dr. Devine in failing to yield the 
right of way to her would either one be sufficient to 
break any line of causation as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
With regards to plaintiffs' case, the trial court fairly, 
fully and very orderly instructed the jury on the issues 
of the case, and in so doing the duty imposed on the 
plaintiffs was not emphasized or accentuated, nor was 
the duty imposed on defendants at all minimized. If it 
was proper to instruct the jury on contributory negli-
gence, it was necessary to keep that issue in mind through-
out the instructions. To do otherwise would most cer-
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tainly have been error. Furthermore, the plaintiffs having 
taken no exceptions to the instructions on these grounds 
at the time of trial, cannot raise the objections for the first 
time on appeal. 
The evidence in the case required that the jury be 
instructed regarding the question of contributory negli-
gence of Mrs. Devine and Janet Gusinda. To have failed 
to do so would have been error. The court's instructions 
on contributory negligence were not prejudicial to plain-
tiffs' case, but if they were, the error now complained of 
was not mentioned in the plaintiffs' exceptions to the 
instructions and it cannot be considered on this appeal. 
If this court were to find error in the instructions 
the judgment should stand as to the defendant, W. S. 
Hatch Co., Inc., as· its motion for directed verdict should 
have been granted. The evidence in the case would have 
required the trial court to direct a verdict for this defend-
ant even if the jury had returned a verdict for plaintiffs. 
The motion was good on the following grounds: That 
there was no actionable negligence on the part of the de-
fendant, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc., as the signal given by 
Herschel Metcalf could only have indicated to Mrs. Cook 
that as between the two he was yielding the right of way 
to her; that such a signal could not have been a proximate 
cause of the collision; and that Mrs. Cook by waiting 
thirty seconds after the signal and then electing to proceed 
and Dr. Devine in failing to yield the right of way to her, 
completely broke any conceivable line of causation. 
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiffs re-
ceived a fair trial at the hands of a conscientious and cap-
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able trial judge and jury, and that the judgment as to this 
defendant, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc., should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
THORNLEY K. SWAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent, W. S. 
Hatch Co., Inc. 
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